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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE
HALLADAY ,
PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

PlaintiffsAppellants ,
vs.
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW
and NORMA G. BIGELOW,

Case No,

DefendantsRespondents

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in construing
the opinion of this court and directions for remand in Halladay
v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d, 500 (Utah 1984) by allowing defendant
Cluff the opportunity to argue the merits of an issue which was
conceded by defendant Cluff and from which defendant Cluff
did not file a cross-appeal.

OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
3.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is

Halladay v. Cluff, No. 860079-CA filed July 10, 1987, reported as
Halladay v. Cluff, 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1987).
of the opinion in included in the Appendix hereto.

A copy

JURISDICTION
1.

The date of the entry of the decision sought to be

reviewed is July 10, 1987.
2.

There have been no requests for rehearing and no

extension of time for filing the petition for certiorari
has been granted.
3. Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred upon the
court by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 (3)(a) and by Rule 42,
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS
The original appeal of this case was filed on or about
October 13, 1981, and the opinion of the Supreme Court was
issued on May 1, 1984. Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500 (Utah
1984).

Therefore, the rule of appellate procedure applicable

to the original appeal was Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which reads:
Where any one or more parties have filed a notice
of appeal as required by Rule 73, other parties may
separately or together cross appeal from the order or
judgment of the lower court without filing a notice of
appeal; provided, however, such party or parties shall
file a statement of the points on which he intends to
rely on such cross appeal within the time and as required
by subdivision (d) of Rule 75.
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff brought this action seeking to quiet title to
certain property shown as Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A attached
hereto•

Defendant Cluff counterclaimed attempting to quiet

title to that same property by virtue of the doctrine of
boundary of acquiescence and also to quiet title to Parcel
W-X-Y-Z shown on Exhibit A.

The trial court quieted title to

Parcel P-M-N-0 in defendants Cluff and Bigelow and quieted
title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs appealed

from the court's ruling with respect to Parcel P-M-N-O.
Neither defendant Cluff nor defendant Bigelow filed a crossappeal with respect to the court's ruling on the W-X-Y-Z
parcel.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
judgment as to the P-M-N-0 parcel and remanded the case
"...with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the
record owners."
1984).

Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500, 502 (Utah

The court held that the decree relying on the doctrine

of boundary by acquiescence
in quieting the claimants' title to Parcel A-B-C-D
[Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A] must therefore be
reversed.
-3-

The decree is reversed, the case is remanded
to the District Court for the entry of a new decree
in conformity with this opinion.
685 P. 2d at 507-508.
On remand, defendant Cluff urged that this court's statement "enter a new decree in conformity with this opinion,"
meant that the trial court should enter a decree quieting title
to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in defendant Cluff.

The lower court ruled

against defendant Cluff on that matter and defendant Cluff
filed an appeal with this court, Case No. 20318.
This court transferred that appeal to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4).
Case No. 860079-CA.

It was assigned

On July 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals

entered its opinion in favor of defendant Cluff.

It is reported

at 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1987), a copy of which is
included in the Appendix hereof.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This court has already decided the appeal of this
matter on the merits in Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500
(1984).

A copy of that case is included in the Appendix

hereof.

The issues presented on this appeal largely involve

procedural matters and do not require a lengthy recitation
of facts. This petition involves defendant Cluffs right to
reverse the trial court's decree that Parcel W-X-Y-Z should
be quieted in plaintiffs. With respect to that parcel,
-4-

plaintiffs put on evidence to establish the elements of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and plaintiff's counsel
was in the middle of cross-examination of defendant Cluff
with respect thereto when the court called a bench conference.
The record of that exchange and the questioning just
prior thereto is as follows:
Q.

Now, so we are not misunderstanding each other, it is
your testimony that they didnft ever drive into here?

A.

Not regularly, no.

Q.

You donft recall

Not on a regular basis.

—

The Court: Mr. Jeffs and Mr. Lewis, will you come to the
Bench for just a minute.
(Discussion off the record between the Court and all
counsel)
The Court: As a result of a Bench Conference, I think
there is no issue on that particular area Mr. Young.
Mr. Young:
Exhibit 8?

The area of "W", "X", "Y", and "Z" on Plaintiffs1

The Court:

Yes.

(Trial Transcript, pp. 133-134) (Record at 172-173).
Following the bench conference and the comments made by
the court with respect thereto, no further evidence was presented
with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z, nor was there further agrument
thereon.

As shown on Exhibit A, Parcel W-X-Y-Z is a strip of

ground which is included in defendant Cluff's record title, but
outside of an existing fenceline that has been there for more
-5-

than fifty years,

(Trial Transcript, p. 60) (Record at 99).

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT CLUFF HAVING ABANDONED HER CLAIM
TO PARCEL W-X-Y-Z AND HAVING FAILED TO FILE
A CROSS-APPEAL FROM THE COURT'S JUDGMENT WITH
RESPECT THERETO, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FOLLOWING
REMAND WITH RESPECT TO PARCEL W-X-Y-Z.
As noted in the foregoing Statement of the Case, the
trial court quieted title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in plaintiffs and
Parcel P-M-N-0 in defendants Cluff and Bigelow.

Plaintiffs

appealed from the court's ruling with respect to Parcel P-M-N-0
and this court reversed the lower court.
supra.

Halladay v. Cluff,

No cross-appeal was filed by defendant Cluff with

respect to the W-X-Y-Z parcel.

On remand defendant Cluff

argued that this court's opinion in Halladay v« Cluff, supra,
should be applied to reverse the trial court's earlier decision
with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z and quiet title to that property
in defendant Cluff by virtue of the recorded deed lines.

The

trial court held that that issue was not before the court on
remand because defendant Cluff did not file a cross appeal.
Defendant Cluff appealed the court's decision and the Court of
Appeals agreed with defendant Cluff.

The case was remanded to

the District Court to determine whether or not defendant Cluff
-6-

is entitled to the W-X-Y-Z parcel by virtue of the evidence in
the record.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals was
persuaded by defendant Cluff's argument that either the doctrine
of boundary by acquiescence or the recorded title line should be
applied to both Parcel P-M-N-0 and Parcel W-X-Y-Z.

Without

reviewing or discussing the facts relative to the application
of boundary of acquiescence to either parcel, the court simply
concluded that either boundary by acquiescence or the title
line should be applied in each case.

Such an approach however,

is an extreme over simplification of the facts giving rise to
boundary by acquiescence with respect to each parcel.

Plaintiffs

in presenting their evidence regarding the applicability of
boundary by acquiescence as to Parcel W-X-Y-Zf were stopped by the
court, a bench conference ensued, and it was concluded that there
was no issue as to boundary by acquiescence with respect to
Parcel W-X-Y-Z.
question.

Defendant Cluff, essentially, was conceding that

Plaintiffs however, did not concede that issue with

respect to Parcel P-M-N-0 and, when the trial court ruled against
them, appealed that question to this court and were successful on
appeal.
Inasmuch as this court is not now in a position to evaluate
the facts giving rise to the applicability of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z, it is
-7-

sufficient to note that the applicability of that doctrine to
that parcel is based on its own facts, and not a common set of
facts that would make that doctrine applicable or not applicable
to both parcels universally.

Defendant Cluff's argument that the

court must uniformly apply title lines or fence lines ignores the
proposition that whether or not fence lines or title lines are
applied depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The court could consistently apply a fence line to one parcel
and a deed or title line to another parcel depending on the
factual circumstances giving rise to the dispute in each
instance.
Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect at
the time plaintiffs1 appeal was filed, reads as follows:
Where any one or more parties have filed a notice
of appeal as required by Rule 73, other parties may
separately or together cross appeal from the order or
judgment of the lower court without filing a notice of
appeal; provided, however, such party or parties shall
file a statement of the points on which he intends to
rely on such cross appeal within the time and as required
by subdivision (d) of Rule 75.
In Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institute, 617 P.
2d 700 (Utah 1980) the court discussed Rule 74(b) at some
length.

After quoting Rule 74(b)f the court quoted Rule 75(d)

and then added its own comments.
"If the respondent desires to cross-appeal, or if
the appellant has filed a statement of points ... and the
respondent desires to have the appellate court consider
-8-

other or additional matters, the respondent shall, within
10 days after the service and filing of appellant's
designation ... serve and file a statement of respondent's
points either by way of such cross-appeal or for the
purpose of having considered other or additional matters
than those raised by the appellant."
From the just-quoted rules, it could hardly be clearer
that if a respondent desires to attack the judgment and
change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-appeal
which plainly states the propositions he intends to rely
on as entitling him to relief. This conforms with the
desired objective of giving his opponent and the court a
clear and definite understanding of the issues to be
treated and of thus proving a firm foundation upon which
the case is to proceed. (Emphasis in original)
617 P. 2d 701.
The Court of Appeals, although acknowledging Rule 74(b)
and this court's opinion in Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile
Institute, supra, simply brushed the rule aside by its simplistic
view of the case.

The Court of Appeals viewed the case as an

all or nothing proposition.

Either boundary by acquiescence

applied or title lines applied.

The Court of Appeals ruled

that since defendant Cluff had succeeded as to Parcel P-M-N-0 in
the trial court, that defendant Cluff had won the case and
therefore needed no cross-appeal.

However, an examination of the

claims made by the parties reveals, as shown above, that different
facts apply to Parcel W-X-Y-Z and the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence may or not have applied to that parcel.

As noted

earlier, plaintiffs' presentation of evidence on that issue was
interrupted by the court and after conference it was conceded
-9-

that defendant Cluff did not claim that property and the
evidence then turned to Parcel P-M-N-O.

Although the Court of

Appeals found that the concession made by defendant Cluff was
ambigous, the comments made by counsel and the court which
supposedly created the ambiguity were made prior to the
presentation of the evidence.
Mr. Jeffs: What I am sayingf when I said the same
principle liesf if the Court is going to follow title
lines rather than boundary by acquiescence, then we
should be entitled to the green slashed area. And we
believe that if Mr. Halladay is entitled to orange
slashed area to this title line, that we are entitled to
move over to the title line. That there should be a
consistency.
The Court: The facts will possibly change the circumstances one place or another —
Mr. Jeffs:

That's possible.

The Court: Depending. But as far as the fenceline
is concerned here, you don't claim to the west of
it, right?
Mr. Jeffs: That's true. We think that it became there by
boundary by acquiescence, the same as we claim the other
piece.
But, if the Court were to adopt the rule that there was
no boundary by acquiescence, and you are going to examine
the title, then I think we would be entitled to that
title.
* * *
The Court: Lets get on with this Court's tasks that we
have now. So there will be no stipulations on that.
(Trial transcript p. 16-17, Record at 55-56).
As is readily apparent from reviewing the above colloquy,
there were no stipulations as to boundaries prior to the
-10-

presentation of the evidence, but after the evidence was put
on, it was conceded by defendant Cluff that there was no issue
on the W-X-Y-Z parcel.

Defendant Cluff could have made the

argument, as did plaintiffs, that the lack of a dispute or
uncertainty with respect to the boundary of the W-X-Y-Z parcel
precluded plaintiffs from claiming that property by boundary by
acquiescense.
The Court of Appeals has departed from this court's
consistent application of Rule 74(b) to deny the raising of
issues which have not been properly preserved by a cross-appeal.
Terry v. Zions Mercantile Institute, supra; Bentley v. Potter,
694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984); Cerritos Trucking Company v. Utah
Venture No. 1, 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1982); and Eliason v. Watts,
615 P. 2d 427 (Utah 1980).

Although the Court of Appeals

distinguishes this case because the court felt that defendant
Cluff had "won" in the lower court, the fact is that defendant
Cluff not only lost with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z, but she
voluntarily conceded that issue.

Contrary to defendant Cluff1s

position this court did not change the rules regarding boundary
by acquiescence but merely clarified that the element of
dispute or uncertainty is a factor to be considered as set
forth in earlier cases.

Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P. 2d 726 (Utah

1981); Wright v. Clissold, 521 P. 2d 1224 (Utah 1974).
It appears that defendant Cluff and the Court of Appeals
-11-

read too much into this court's instructions to the trial court
to enter a "new decree in conformity with this opinion."

Halladay

v. Cluff, supra at 508. The court noted in that opinion, that the
only issue before the court was with respect to Parcel P-M-N-0
and the court specifically reversed the trial court on that issue
"with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the record
owners."

Halladay v. Cluff, supra at 502.

CONCLUSION
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, sets forth some
guidelines for the exercise of the court's discretion in granting
a petition for writ of certiorari.

Subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Rule

43 read as follows:
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in
conflict with a decision of this Court; (3) When a
panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of this Court's power of supervision.
In this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals clearly
conflicts with earlier pronouncements of this court regarding
the application of Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It provides for a remand of matters which were not preserved
by a cross-appeal, which is a clear and substantial departure
from the normal course of judicial proceedings. Therefore,
-12-

plaintiffs respectfully request that the court grant their
petition for a writ of certiorari, to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Dated this

/ &

day of August, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed four copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, postage prepaid, to S. Rex Lewis, Esq., Attorney
for Defendants Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., Attorney
for Defendant Cluff, addressed follows this / 0

day of August,

1987.
S. REX LEWIS
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorney at Law
120 East 300 North
:ovo, Utah
84601

M. DAYLE JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah
84601
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fact, Biesmger was never a partner The partnership
consisted of two corporations and Frandsen See
Burke \ Farrell, 656 P 2d 1015 (Utah 1982), and
Velson v Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 P 865 (1910),
which discuss the fiduciary dut> that exists between
partners
3 In some jurisdictions, these actions by Frandsen
would be sufficient to constitute his waiver of
default by any of the defendants, even if default
had aheadv been entered 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments §1161(1969)
4 In this appeal, Frandsen has not challenged the
judgment below insofar as it dismissed his complaints against the defendants other than Biesmger and
the Laubs.

know it and didn't disclose it, or
are you going to claim vour evidence is they knew it and didn't
disclose it 9
MR. FRANDSEN. I don't know
whether they knew it or not. I
asked him if there was any other
indebtedness and they said so [sic).
So I paid them the balance that was
owing based upon their representations.
THE COURT: You're not going to
have any evidence they knew about
it, had actual knowledge as opposed
to information because it was on
the record 9
MR. FRANDSEN: No, I don't
know if they had knowledge. I
can't prove that, Your Honor.
Frandsen went forward and presented his
case.3 True to his word, he produced no evidence that any of the individual defendants,
including Biesmger, had actual knowledge in
October, 1981, that Laubs' judgment had
been filed in Weber Countv or that the lien
thereof had attached to the subject property.
Constructive knowledge imparted by the filing
of the judgment was charged to Frandsen by
law, as well as to defendants. See Utah Code
A n n . §17-21-11 (1987) and §57-1-6
(1986); Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1
P.2d 242 (1931).
In dismissing appellant's causes of actions
against all the named defendants, 4 the lower
court concluded that Frandsen 'did not reasonably rely on any statements or omissions of
the defendants, m that the Judgment hen of
the Laubs was of public record ...." The judgment below is affirmed Costs are awarded to
respondents Max and Eva Laub.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1 CONCURRichard C Davidson, Judge
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1 Thirty percent of a one-third interest is actually
9.99Vo, not 10^o
2 Frandsen's second cause of action was based on
alleged violation of Utah Code Ann §48-1-17
(1981), which provides
Duty of partners to render information
Partners shall render on demand true
and full information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner, or
the legal representatives of any deceased
partner, or partner under legal disability
However, Frandsen alleged in his Amended
Amended Complaint that Biesmger sold his partnership interest on June 12, 1981 and that at the time
Laubs' judgment was docketed, Biesmger did not
have any interest in the partnership Franasen's
evidence did noi contradict those allegations In
For complete Ltab Code Annotations,

nx-ruiws
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Mack HALL AD AY and Merle Hailaday,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigeiow, and Norma
G. Bigeiow,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Or me, Garff, and Jackson.
No. 860079-CA
FILED: July 10, 1987
FOURTH DISTRICT
Hon George E. Ballif
ATTORNEYS:
Daylc M. Jeffs for Appellant.
Brent D Young, S Rex Lewis for
Respondents
j

OPINION

| ORME, Judge:
Halladays commenced this action to quiet
J title to a parcel of property sometimes referred
to as the orange parcel. They relied on their
I holding actual legal title. Cluff counterclaimed
seeking to quiet title to the orange parcel on
the basis of boundary by acquiescence and,
alternatively, seeking to quiet title to another
parcel of property, sometimes referred to as
I the green parcel, if the court determined to
adjudicate the rights of the parties with reference to legal titles rather than on the basis of
boundary by acquiescence. The unusual situation came about because Halladays held legal
title to the orange parcel, which Cluff1 occupied, while Cluff held legal title to the green
parcel, which Halladays occupied If occupancy controlled, Cluff would own the orange
| parcel and Halladays the green. If legal title
> controlled, Halladays would own the orange
• parcel and Cluff the green Under no consisconsult CodetCo's Annotation Service

oi
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tently applied theory would either party be
entitled to both parcels.
Guff was successful at trial, persuading the
court to adjust the parties' competing rights
on the basis of the boundary by acquiescence
doctrine. Thus, she was held to have title to
the larger orange parcel primarily in dispute,
but Halladays got the smaller green parcel on
the same basis.
Halladays appealed to the Supreme Court
and were successful there. Halladay v. Cluff,
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Supreme Court
held that boundary by acquiescence did not
apply, given the facts developed at trial, and
that legal title should control. See id. at 507.
Of course, since the judgment had been
adverse to Halladays only as concerned the
orange parcel, the orange parcel was the focus
of the appeal.2 The case was remanded for
entry of "a new decree in conformity* with the
Supreme Court's opinion.
On remand, Cluff argued that consistency
with the Supreme Court's analysis required
that her alternative claim be granted. Cluff
argued that if legal title was to control, it
should control the whole dispute, and she
should be awarded the green parcel, to which
she held title.
The trial court, however, concluded that
Cluffs failure to take a cross-appeal from
the determination concerning the green parcel
foreclosed any re-examination of that issue.
We cannot agree. Cross-appeals are properly
limited to grievances a party has with the
judgment as it was entered-not grievances
it might acquire depending on the outcome of
the appeal. See Cunningham v. LynchDavidson Motors, lnc.y 425 So.2d 131, 133
(Fla. App. 1982)(cross-appeal only required
when respondent seeks to vary or modify
judgment below); Terry v. Zions Co-Op.
Mercantile Inst., 617 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah
1980X"[IJf a respondent desires to attack the
judgment and change it in his favor, he must
timely file a cross-appeal ..."). See also 15 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3904 (1976).
Cluff knew all along she could not have it
both ways. Either boundary by acquiescence
would apply, in which case she would win the
larger parcel but lose the smaller, or legal titles
would control, in which event she would lose
the larger parcel but at least get the smaller
one. 3 She could not plausibly argue one theory
as to one parcel and another as to the other
and walk away with both contested parcels.
On balance, Cluff would come out much
better if the boundary by acquiescence argument carried the day. She accordingly argued
for application of that theory. She prevailed at
the trial level to the fuOest extent possible
consistent with a disciplined decision, even
though she "lost" as to the green parcel.
Halladays appealed, arguing that legal titles,
not the doctrine, should govern. Cluffs

i
j
!
|

Codt«Co
Prove Utah

proper response to that appeal was to resist
the Halladays* arguments and seek to have the
trial court affirmed. A cross-appeal would
not have been appropriate. Cluff had no dissatisfaction with the trial court's judgment,
which she simply wanted to have affirmed.
Moreover, a cross-appeal would have left
Cluff and Halladays making inconsistent and
contrary arguments depending on which parcel
was being focused on. 4
I Thus, the absence of a cross-appeal did
not, of itself, foreclose the trial court from
I reassessing the status of the green parcel in
j view of the Supreme Court's decision and
I changing its decree as to that parcel as well, so
the 'new decree" would be fully "in conformity" with the doctrine expressed in the
| Court's opinion. 5 1
However, for the trial court to be able to
address the green parcel on remand, i.e., to
reconsider the claim in the alternative that if
j Cluff did not own the orange parcel she
j owned the green one, it would be necessary
that that claim had not been compromised,
dismissed, or otherwise unconditionally dispI osed of. If, as Halladays suggest on this
\ appeal, Cluff unqualifiedly waived her claim
| to the smaller parcel, without regard to the
disposition made as to the larger one or the
legal doctrine underlying that disposition,
Cluff would not be entitled to any relief. If,
j on the other hand, the claim to the green
parcel was expressly preserved or had been
resolved only as a necessary part of the basic
determination concerning boundary by acquiescence, Cluff would clearly be entitled to an
opportunity to show the trial court that the
Supreme Court's reversal as to the larger
parcel necessitates a "reversal" as to the other.*
We have reviewed the record, with considerable care, with an eye toward determining
I whether the claim was unqualifiedly waived.
| Cluffs counterclaim was crystal clear that she
| should be declared the owner of the orange
parcel on the basis of the doctrine of bounI dary by acquiescence, but that if she was
unsuccessful, she should be declared the owner
of the green parcel because of the "identical
circumstances" concerning each parcel. At
trial, Cluff explained her position, through
counsel, in response to the court's initial
perception that she was conceding her rights to
the green parcel:
What I'm saying, when I said the
same principle lies, if the Court is
going to follow title lines, rather
than boundary by acquiescence,
i
then we would be entitled- to the
j
green slashed area. And we believe
I
that if Mr. Halladay is entitled to
the orange slashed area to this title
line, that we are entitled to move
|
over to the title line. That there

j
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Accordingly,
the
trial
court's
order
of
should be a consistency
Counsel for Halladavs then sought to chara- October 18, 1984 is vacated and the case is
cterize G u f f s position as conceding the green again remanded to the trial court "for the
parcel The court explained that Cluff simply entry of a new decree in conformity with* the
wanted a consistent legal approach and conc- Supreme Court's pnor decision In that
luded by observing "So there will be no stip- regard, Cluff is entitled to an opportunity to
ulations on that " The parties then presented show the trial court that the evidence adduced
their evidence. After argument, the court at trial as to the green parcel, when squared
issued a written decision It recited no waiver with the Supreme Court's decision, entitles
or concession by Cluff as to the green parcel, Cluff to the green parcel If it does, the "new
but rather reached the merits and found that decree" contemplated by the Supreme Court
Halladays had established entitlement to it on should so provide Costs of this appeal to
the basis of boundary by acquiescence under Cluff
the cases of Fuoco v Wilhams, 15 Utah 2d
Gregory K Orme, Judge
156, 389 P 2d 143 (1964), and Hales v Frames,
WE
CONCUR
600 P 2d 556 (1979) Conversely, the trial
R. W Garff, Judge
court found, relying principally on the same
Norman H Jackson, Judge
cases, that Cluff had established entitlement to
the orange parcel on the basis of boundary by
acquiescence Subsequently, the court entered 1 The orange parcel was actually occupied and
Findings and Conclusions which reflect that claimed by the Bigelows and Guff, adjacent landthe court reached the merits on both the green owners, apparently as though the undisputed bouand the orange parcels and decided both sit- ndary between them continued on through the
orange parcel Bigelows are not parties to the instant
uations on the basis of a consistent application appeal and in the interest of simplicity we refer only
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
to Cluff even in situations where technically the
A single, short decree recited the result of the reference should be to 'Cluff and Bigelows *
court's decision and quieted title to the green 2 The orange parcel, labeled MNOP on d u f f s
parcel in Halladays and the orange parcel in exhibits, was referred to in Halladay v Cluff, 685
P 2d 500 (Utah 1981), as the ABCD parcel Id at
Cluff
We see in none of this any concession or 502 The green parcel, labeled WXYZ on the exhibits, was not delineated on the Supreme Court's
waiver by Cluff The only place to which map, but lies to the west of the ADE line on their
Halladays specifically point us in support of map Sec id
their contention that there was such a waiver, 3 The trial court appreciated the need for a consiis at best ambiguous The exchange followed stent approach to the entire dispute and later refean unreported bench conference and is, in its rred to its decree as *a fence-line decree *
4 The facts of this case are extremely unusual and
entirety, as follows
it might even look like a case where some kind of
The Court As a result of a Bench
"contingent" cross-appeal should have been filed
Conference, I think there is no issue
That illusion disappears if one focuses not on the
on that particular area, Mr Young
component pans of the dispute but rather on the
Mr Young The area of "W", »X"
"Y" and "Z" on Plaintiffs' Exhibit
8*>
The Court: Yes.
While we would m any event be unwilling to
construe that bnef exchange between the court
and Halladays* counsel as a concession by
Cluff, we are especially not inclined to do so
since the court m its decision made no
mention of any concession or waiver by Cluff,
but rather spoke in terms of a decision on the
merits At the hearing before the trial court
following remand by the Supreme Court,
Halladays* counsel acknowledged that the
green parcel had been tned and not resolved
by stipulation. Moreover, the court's remarks
at that hearing, and in its subsequent written
ruling, make clear the exclusive basis for its
decision not to reconsider its disposition of the
green parcel was its conclusion that the failure
of Cluff to cross-appeal precluded it from
doing so. No mention was made by the court
of any pre-judgment concession or waiver by
Cluff

dispute as a whole and the pivotal role in us resolution of the selection and consistent applicauon of
one of two competing legal doctrines Generally,
however, the decision whether to cross appeal is
simple If a respondent wishes to modify or vary the
tnal court's judgment, he must cross appeal See
Mann v Oppcnhcimcr & Co , 517 A 2d 1056, 1060
(Del Supr 1986X"[A]bsent a cross-appeal, the
[respondent! may not attack the judgment of the
court below with a view to enlarging its own rights
or lessening the nghts of its adversary "), Terry v
Zions Co-Op Mercantile Inst, 617 P 2d 700, 701
(Utah 1980) If he only wants the judgment affirmed, he should not cross appeal Nothing in this
opinion should be taken to create allowances for
parties who should cross appeal but do not See,
eg, Bentiey v Porrer, 694 P 2d 617, 622 (Utah
1984), Cemtos Trucking Co v Utah Venture No
1, 645 P 2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982), Ehason v Watts,
615 P 2d 427, 431 (Utah 1980) See also Ryan v
State, 150 Ariz 549, 724 P 2d 1218, 223 (Ariz App
1986)(respondent can't raise assignment of error
because issue not made subject of cross appeal),
Broadhead v McEntire, 19 Ark App 259, 720
S W 2 d 313, 318 (1986Xrespondent can't argue for
specific performance because filed no crossappeal), Hein Enterprises, Ltd v S F Real Estate
Invs , 720 P 2d 9 7 5 , 980 ( C o l o A p p
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1985){respondem's failure to perfect cross-appeal entity. For purposes of satisfying the ICC's
precluded raising attorney's fee issue)
I requirements for the sale of authority, Barker
5 Trial courts are in a much better position to established Utah Carriers Incorporated ("Utah
evaluate an entire case, including its nuances and Carriers") with his father-in-law, G. Eugene
undisclosed pitfalls, than an appellate court. It is for England ("England") as President and a direthis reason that where, as in this case, all possible ! ctor of the corporation.
ramifications of a decision on appeal may not be
On April 12, 1978, Bray Lines transferred
readily apparent, a case will be remanded for such
proceedings as are appropriate in view of the guid- its authority to operate a motor carrier service
ance offered in the opinion. It is no doubt for this to Utah Carriers. In exchange, Utah Carriers
reason the Supreme Court, m addition to specific- executed and delivered to Bray Lines a proally directing the trial court to quiet title to the missory note for the sum of $309,438.49. The
orange parcel m the Halladays, remanded in general promissory note was signed on behalf of Utah
terms for "the entry of a new decree in conformity Carriers by England, President. Also on April
with* its opinion.
12, 1978, England executed an unconditional
6 Loosely following the trial court's characterizapersonal
guarantee as collateral for the printion quoted in Note 2, supra, Cluff wants nothing
more than an opportunity to persuade the trial court cipal obligation. Following consummation of
that the Supreme Court's decision simply means the this arrangement, England was not active in
court's decree should have been a "title-lines the operations of Utah Carriers nor was he
compensated by Utah Carriers.
decree" rather than a "fence-line decree."
In 1980, the trucking industry was deregulated, rendenng the previously granted operating authority worthless. Subsequently, Utah
Carriers
defaulted on the note; Bray Lines
Cite as
consequently filed suit against Utah Carriers
61 Utah Adv. Rep. 44
and England to recover the $44,556.39 outstj anding balance. The court granted summary
IN T H E
judgment against both defendants.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I.
BRAY LINES INC.,
I Summary judgment should be granted only
Plaintiff and Respondent,
j when it is clear from the undisputed facts that
v.
I the opposing partv cannot prevail. Frisbec v.
UTAH CARRIERS, INC., a Utah
\ K SL K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
Corporation, and G. Eugene England, an
1984); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In consideindividual.
I ring a summary judgment, the court must
Defendants and Appellants.
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood and Orme. | inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. Fnsbee, 676 P.2d at 389.
No. 860133-CA
This Court must determine whether the undiFILED: July 10, 1987
sputed facts support the trial court's conclusion that England, as a matter of law, was
THIRD DISTRICT
I liable on his personal guarantee.
Hon. Raymond S. Uno

n.

ATTORNEYS:
John T. Caine for Appellant.
Michael K. Mohrman for Respondent.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
G. Eugene England appeals from* the trial
court's granting of Bray Lines Incorporated's
motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
In April of 1978. Bray Lines Incorporated
("Bray Lines") was approached by Duane
Barker ("Barker"), president of International
Contract Carriers trucking company. In that
capacity, Barker entered into negotiations with
Bray Lines for the purchase of its Interstate
Commerce Commission ("ICC") authority to
operate motor carrier service over certain
routes. Barker was advised that Bray Lines
could not sell the authority directly to an existing company, but could only sell it to a new

|
|
j
i
1
1

!
I

England asserts that enforcement of the
note and guarantee would be unconscionable
because the operating rights were rendered
worthless due to deregulation. The determination of whether a contract is unconscionable
is made with reference to the conditions that
existed at the time the contract was executed.
Bekms Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455,
461 (Utah 1983). In analyzing whether the
contract is unconscionable, it is appropriate to
consider the terms of the contract as well as
the relative positions of the parties and circumstances surrounding the execution of the
contract. Id.
In this case, the terms of the guarantee are
unambiguous, straightforward, and understandable.1 Moreover, there is no evidence of a
gross inequality of bargaining power. Rather,
the parties are expenenced in business and
they freely entered into this business venture;
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BRENT D. YOUNG
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT
84603
Telephone: 37 5-3000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE
HALLADAY,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
vs.
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW
and NORMA G. BIGELOW,

Civil No. 53,243

Defendants.
This matter came before the court on the 21st day of September,
1984, wherein the court heard oral argument from counsel as to
the disposition to be made of this case on remand from the
Supreme Court, and all of counsel were heard and the court having
tnoroughly considered the alternatives, and the language of the
Supreme Court directing that they " . . .

reverse with directions

to quiet title in the Halladays, the record owners."
It is noted that the plaintiffs Halladay appealed from the
court's ruling as to that portion of defendant's Exhibit 12
identified as "A", "E", "C", "D" or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal
was taken as to the court's finding of boundary by acquiescence
as to Tracts 1 and 2 in Bigelow and Cluff respectively.

Therefore,

the only matter before the Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3
and that the same be auieted in the record owners.

The court

tnerefore directs counsel for Kalladays to prepare a new decree
quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 along the description contained froir. points "A" to "B" to "C" to "D".
Based upon the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That title to the following described property is

is quieted in plaintiffs, Mack Halladay and. Merle Halladay:
Commencing 488.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North
from the Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
thence West 118.10 feet, thence North 0° 03f 17 w
East along a fence line 55.31 feet, thence South 89°
51f 20" East along a fence line 118.20 feet thence
South 0° 09f 25" West along a fence line, 55.01 feet
to the point of beginning. Area .15 acres.
2.

That ail other claims raised by the defendants as

against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and
are res judicata.
Dated:

October

/ ^T

, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

/

•

'

'

-

^

*

'cSEbRGE^ E. iBALLI-F, Judge
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Mack HALLADAY and Merle Halladay.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Madge CLUFF, Perry K. Bigelow and
Norma G. Bigelow, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 18032.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1984.

In a boundary dispute, the Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J., sustained defendants' ownership of disputed tract under doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence, and record owners of the
tract appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks,
J., held that: (1) with regard to requirements that there must be uncertainty or
dispute over location of boundary before
claim based on boundary by acquiescence
can be maintained, existence of dispute or
uncertainty should be measured against objective test of reasonableness, so that dispute is not proved by mere difference of
opinion, and uncertainty is not proved by
mere lack of actual knowledge of true location of the boundary; (2) where boundary
dispute involves property in city for which
survey information is readily available, party claiming boundary by acquiescence has
burden of proving objective uncertainty as
one of the prima facie elements of the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; and
(3) defendants failed to'establish applicability of doctrine of boundary by acquiescence,
where defendants had ready access to
deeds and had actually examined surveys
clearly establishing plaintiffs' record title
to property in dispute.

1. Boundaries <s=>48(3)
Period of acquiescence required for reliance on a ''boundary by acquiescence"
depends on the circumstances of the particular case, but only under unusual circumstances would period be less than 20 years.
2. Boundaries <s=48(2)
For purposes of rule that doctrine of
"boundary by acquiescence" cannot be applied where there is no dispute or uncertainty concerning location of the boundary,
"dispute" is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge
of the true location of the boundary; "dispute or uncertainty" should be measured
against an objective test of reasonableness,
rather than against a subjective test under
which a boundary line could be uncertain or
in dispute even though capable of being
readily ascertained; rejecting Ekberg v.
Bates, 121 Utah 123, 239 P.2d 205 and
Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110 Utah 523,
175 P.2d 718.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

di-

3. Boundaries <S>48(2)
Under doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence," property line shown on record
title cannot be displaced by another boundary unless it is shown that during the period of acquiescence there was some objectively measurable circumstance in the
record title or in the reasonably available
survey information, or other technique by
which record title information was located
on the ground, that would have prevented a
landowner, as a practical matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary; by the same token, a
claimant cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in title
had reason to know the true location of the
boundary7 during the period of acquiescence.

Howe, J., filed an opinion concurring
and dissenting.

4. Boundaries <s=>48(2)
Examples of objectively measurable
uncertainties in location of boundary, based

Reversed
rections.

and

remanded

with
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whicn doctrine of boundarv b\ acquies
cence would be appropriate if the doctrine s
other requirements Here met are inability
to locate monuments established in original
survev interna1 inconsistencies in plat no
official or original plat or survev b\ which
boundary line could be located disagreement among different surveyors on locauon of boundary hne landmarks referenced in deeds that have disappeared, uncertainties or disputes created bv conflict
mg terms in deeds such as overlapping
description or metes and bounds descriptions that do not close boundarv b\ acquiescence should also be available where
there are other inconsistencies that create
reasonable doubt m the meaning of the
record title or m its application to the actual on-the-ground location of the propertv
identified in the record
5. Boundaries c=>33
Where boundary dispute involves property m city for which survev information is
readily available party claiming boundarv
bv acquiescence has burden of proving objectiv e uncertainty about the location of the
boundary as one of the prima facie elements of the doctrine of boundarv by acquiescence, rejecting Brown i Milliner,
120 Utah 16 232 P 2d 202, Wright v Citssold 521 P 2d 1224 Universal Invest
mentCorp i Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35
484 P 2d 173 King i Fronk, 14 Utah 2d
135 378 P 2d 893 Mortzkus v Carroll 7
Utah 2d 237 322 P 2d 391
6. Boundaries <s=»48(2)
Notwithstanding allocation to party
claiming boundary by acquiescence of bur
den of proof of objective uncertainty as one
of the prima facie elements of the doctrine
of boundary of acquiescence, record landowner may conclusively negate the existence of objective uncertainty by proving
that the claimant or his predecessors m
title had reason to know the location of the
true boundary before the expiration of the
penod of acquiescence
7. Boundaries ®=>48(2)
Claimants failed to establish applicability of doctrine of boundary by acquies-

cence where claimants had read\ access to
deeds and had actualh examined surveys
clearh establismng adioimng landowners
record title to property m dispute
Brent D Young, Provo for plaintiffs and
appellants
M Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for Cluff
S Rex Lewis Provo for Bigelow
OAKS Justice
This is an appeal from a judgment reiv
mg on boundary bv acquiescence to quiet
title to a 52 5- by 118-foot parcel oi real
property m the city of Provo The issues
are whether a showing of uncertaintv or
dispute on the location of a boundarv line is
necessarv to the application of boundarv bv
acquiescence ana if bo what is meant bv
"uncertainty ana who has the Duraen of
proving it
The property m issue is locatec m Provo
City and is shown as parcel A-B-C-D on
the accompanvmg map From 1930 to the
present, there has been a fence along lines
E-A-B-F
It extends approximately 52
feet behind the rear property lines (C-D) of
lots 1 and 2 This extension apparently
resulted from an assumption that tne 231foot depth of these lots was measured from
the edge of the street instead of from the
points across 100 South Street shown on
the legal aescnptions
The fence was clearly visible when the
Bigelow s purchased lot 1 m 1947 and when
Cluff acquired lot 2 in 1948 The Halladays acquired lot 3, which contains most of
the disputed parcel, in 1958 (They purchased lot 5 m 1950 and lot 4 in 1961)
When the Bigelows and Cluff purchased
lots 1 and 2, they assumed their properties
extended to the back fence at line A-B
Acting accordingly, they cultivated gardens
and built and maintained several chicken
coops on their respective portions of parcel
A-B-C-D Bigelows had a survey made in
1956 that placed their rear boundary near
line C-D, but they and Cluff apparentlv
believed the survev to be erroneous In
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1975 Cluff obtained a plat that placed her
rear boundary at line C-D

During the period of their adiommg proi>
ert\ ou nersnip the Hallada\ s maintained
tnat Bigelow^ and Cluff s true
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boundanes were at line O D Mr Halladay informed Mr Bigelow of this fact on
one occasion in the 1950s and told him not
to use the disputed parcel on several occasions m the 1970s Halladays had no discussions with Cluff regarding the property
line until shortly before this litigation com
menced Halladays made very little use of
lot 3
In 1979, the Halladays commenced this
suit to quiet title to parcel A-B-C-D The

Bigelows and Cluff counterciaimed and the
distnct court sustained their ownership of
this parcel under the doctrine of boundan
by acquiescence On appeal the Halladavs
3eek to overturn that decision on the basis
that boundary by acquiescence cannot be
applied where there was no dispute or un
certainty concerning the location of the
boundary We agree and reverse ^ith di
rections to quiet title m the Halladays the
record owners
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I

UNCERTAINTY OR DISPUTE AS
^ \ INGREDIENT IN BOUNDARY
BY ACQUIESCENCE
The doctrine of boundary bv acquiescence has been the source of considerable
confusion and controvers\ among juages
lawyers, and landowners in this state
Kino i Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135 139, 378
P2d 893 895 (1963), Note Boundary by
Acquiescence, 3 Utah LRe\ 504, 504
(1953) See generally Note, Boundaries
bv Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah,
1975 Utah L Rev 221 One of the primary
areas of confusion is the requirement of
the ' presence or absence of dispute and/or
uncertainty as to boundary" King v
Fronk, 14 Utah 2d at 139, 378 P 2d at 895
[1] Much of the confusion has resulted
from the intermingling of rules governing
boundary oy acquiescence and boundary by
parol agreement Annot., 7 A L R 4th 53,
59 (1981) Both of these doctrines identify
circumstances in ^hich landowners can establish boundary lines without a written
agreement Originally the two \* ere easih
distinguishable because boundary b\ parol
agreement required an express parol
agreement with respect to a boundan7 but
no period of acquiescence, while bounaan
b\ acquiescence reauired a lengthv period
of acquiescence but no express parol agreement Hummel v Young, 1 Utah 2d 237
239-40, 265 P 2d 410 411 (1953), Brown v
Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 25, 232 P 2d 202,
207 (1951), Note, 1975 Utah L.Rev , supra,
at 224 1
With time, the distinctions between
boundary by agreement and boundary by
acquiescence became blurred. The requirement of an express parol agreement began
to be articulated among the elements of
boundary by acquiescence, although this
Court said that "the law will imply an
agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts
1. The period of acquiescence required for
boundary by acquiescence has not been quanti
fied into an exact period of time, it depends on
the circumstances of the particular case This
Courts most recent discussion identifies it as a
"long period of time
generalK related to the
common law prescriptive period of 20 years,

appearing
Hummel i Young 1
Utah 2d at 240 265 P 2d at 411 Similam,
the reauirement of a long period of acquiescence was applied to boundan by agreement Hobson v Panguitch Lake Corp,
Utan, 530 P 2d 792 794(1975) Blanchard
z Smith 123 Utah 119, 121, 255 P 2d 729,
730 (1953) In various opinions the Court
even referred to boundary b\ agreement
and boundary by acquiescence as if they
had merged into one See eg, Hobson v
Panguitch Lake Corp, 530 P2d at 794
(reference to "the doctrine of boundan by
acquiescence or agreement"), Carter i
Lindner 23 Utah 2d 204, 460 P2d 830
(1969) (reference to "boundan line b\ acquiescence under an oral agreement"),
Note, 1975 Utah L Rev , supra, at 222-23
The confusion stemming from the intermingling of boundan by agreement and
boundan' by acquiescence has carried over
to the subject of uncertainty or dispute
over the boundan
Ongmallv, this was
mentioned as a requirement only m connection with boundary by agreement Rydalch v Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 109 107 P
25, 29 (1910) In that context, uncertainty
or dispute over the boundan would precede and provide the motivation for the
oral agreement In 1928, this Court began
to refer to uncertainty or dispute as a
matter to be considered m boundan h\
acquiescence Tripp i Bagley, 74 Utan
57, 66-72, 276 P 912 916-18 (1928!
Thereafter, the opinions of this Court frequent!} referred to a showing of uncertamtv or dispute as an essential ingredient m
the application of the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence Madsen v Clegg, Utah,
639 P 2d 726, 728-29 (1981), Leon v Dansie, Utah, 639 P 2d 730, 731 (1981), Wright
v Clissold, Utah, 521 P2d 1224, 1226
(1974), Universal Investment Corp i
Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 37-38 484 P 2d
173, 174-75 (1971), Glenn v Whitney, 116
and onl\ under unusual circumstances would a
lesser period be deemed sufficient' Hobson v
Panguitch Lake Corp Ltah 530 P 2d 792 795
(1975) (10 vears held insufficient) Accord King
v Fronk, 14 Utah 2d 135, 141-42, 378 P 2d 893,
897 (1963)
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Utah 267. 272-73. 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949);
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley. 105
Utah 208, 219, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943);
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93. 34
P.2d 697, 698-99 (1934). Although there
are admittedly some other opinions
throughout this period that make no mention of a showing of uncertainty or dispute,2 we have concluded from the more
recent cases and from the clear weight of
authority that the relevance of this ingredient is settled in our law. See generally
Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1430, 1501-04 (1930), supplemented in 113 A.L.R. 421, 436 (1938); 12
Am.Jur.2d Boundaries §§ 78-79, 83, 88
(1964).
The difficult issues in respect to uncertainty or dispute as an ingredient in boundary by acquiescence concern the meaning
of these terms and who has the burden of
proof. As demonstrated hereafter, our
opinions have not given consistent answers
to these questions. The contest is typically
between interests that are both worthy—
the desire to confirm boundaries that have
apparently been recognized on the ground
over a long period of time and the desire to
enhance reliance on the property dimensions shown in the county records. The
law clearly gives precedence to the record
title, with boundary by acquiescence being
an exception, but the conditions of that
exception have not been settled with clarity
or adhered to with consistency, in part because of the bewildering variety of factual
circumstances in which the question arises.
In general, when survey information is
reasonably available (such as when reliable
survey control points are accessible to the
land and survey costs are not disproportionate to the value of ,the land) so that it is
reasonable to expect the parties to locate
their boundary on the ground by surveys,
the courts should be less willing to apply
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
2. Eg., Goodman v. Wilkinson, Utah, 629 P.2d
447 (1981); Monroe v. Harper, Utah, 619 P.2d
323 (1980); Hales v. Frakes, Utah, 600 P.2d 556
(1979). See also Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah at
25, 232 P.2d at 207 (uncertainty or dispute characterized as the "fiction" on which boundary7 by
acquiescence is grounded).

This reasonable availability of survey information obviously varies from place to place
and from time to time. However, it can be
said in general that survey information is
more available and its cost is less likely to
be disproportionate in relation to the value
of the land in city and platted areas than in
rural or wilderness areas. It can also be
said in general that technological advances
in survey techniques (as well as in the
accuracy and accessibility of record title
information) is tipping the scales toward
greater reliance on record title information
and lesser reliance on boundary by acquiescence.3 The law should conform to those
realities.
II. THE MEANING OF UNCERTAINTY
OR DISPUTE OVER BOUNDARY
In some earlier cases, uncertainty or dispute had to be traceable to an objectively
determinable ambiguity in a deed or survey, so that the true location of the boundary could not be readily ascertained. Ir
was not established by proving that neither
adjoining landowner knew the exact location of the boundary, because "lack of
knowledge as to the location of the true
boundary is not synonymous with uncertainty." Glenn v. Whitney. 116 Utah at
273, 209 P.2d at 260; Note. 1975 Utah
L.Rev.. supra, at 231-32. However, later
cases rejected this objective measurement
in favor of a subjective test in which "a
boundary line may be 'uncertain' or in
dispute' even though it is capable of being
readily ascertained." Ekberg v. Bates. 121
Utah 123, 127, 239 P.2d 205. 207 (1951),
quoting Willie v. Local Realty Co., 110
Utah 523, 531, 175 P.2d 718, 723 (1946).
Uncertainty or dispute was much easier to
prove under this rule, which therefore had
the effect of increasing the availability of
3. When boundary by acquiescence was first introduced in Utah almost a century ago, Swiizgable v. Worseldine, 5 Utah 315, 15 P. 144 (1887),
much of the state had not been surveyed and
searches of record title may have been difficult
to conduct.
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boundary by acquiescence and decreasing
reliance on the record title
[2] After carefully considering our previous decisions on this question, we return
to the more rigorous definition set forth m
Glenn v. Whitney, supra, and hold that
"dispute" is not proved by a mere difference of opinion, and "uncertainty" is not
proved by a mere lack of actual knowledge
of the true location of the boundary. This
is the thrust of our recent decisions on this
subject, e.g., Madsen v. Clegg, supra, and
it is the holding of the better-reasoned
cases in other jurisdictions. E.g., Buza v.
Wojtaleuncz, 48 Wis.2d 557, 564-67, 180
K.W.2d 556, 560-61 (1970); Hartung v.
Witte. 59 Wis. 285, 298-300. 18 N.W. 175,
180-81 (1884), Fry v. Smith. 91 Idaho 740,
741-42, 430 P.2d 486. 487-88 (1967). Finally, the ingredient that has been called "dispute or uncertainty" should be measured
against an objective test of reasonableness
and should therefore more appropriately be
called "objective uncertainty."
[3] Under the rule as we have defined it
here, the property line shown on the record
title cannot be displaced by another boundary unless it is shown that during the period of acquiescence there was some objectively measurable circumstance in the
record title or m the reasonably available
survey information (or other technique by
which record title information was located
on the ground) that would have prevented
a landowner, as a practical matter, from
being reasonably certain about the true
location of the boundary. By the same
token, a claimant cannot assert boundary
by acquiescence if he or his'predecessors in
title had reason to know the true location
of the boundary during the period of acquiescence.
Our decision to measure compliance with
the requirement of "objective uncertainty"
by whether the landowner, as a practical
matter, could be reasonably certain about
the true location of the boundary on the
ground is supported by two policy considerations.

First, by allowing less latitude for boundary by acquiescence, we minimize conflict
with the objectives of our statute of frauds,
which forbids the transfer of interests m
real property without a written conveyance. U.C.A., 1953. § 25-5-1; Madsen v.
Clegg, 639 P.2d at 728-29; Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah at 68-72, 276 P. at 916-18.
Second, an objective test, which minimizes reliance on boundary by acquiescence,
corresponds more closely to the purposes
of that doctrine. This Court has recognized that "[t]he very reason for being of
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
or agreement is .. [to avoid] stirring up
controversy." Hobson v. Panguitch Lake
Corp., 530 P.2d at 794, to prevent litigation, and to promote repose of title and
stability m boundaries. Hates v. Frakes.
600 P 2d at 559. These purposes are best
furthered if those who purchase, use. or
sell real property must rely on descriptions
in deeds and reasonably available survey
information to settle boundary questions m
the first instance. Only when it is not
reasonable to expect landowners to ascertain the true location of the boundary by
this manner should landowners be allowed
to claim boundary by acquiescence. See
Hartung v. Witte. 59 Wis. at 298-300, 18
N.W. at 180-81. Allowing a claimant to
forego reasonably available means of determining the true boundary and to assert
his lack of "actual knowledge" as a basis
for boundary by acquiescence fosters uncertainty on the location of boundaries and
magnifies the number of instances in which
landowners have to resolve disputes by litigation.
[4] Boundary by acquiescence remains
a viable means of establishing a boundary
where there is objective uncertainty in the
location of the true boundary that cannot
reasonably be resolved by reference to the
record title and by use of reasonably available survey information. For example, following are instances of objectively measurable uncertainties in which boundary by
acquiescence would be appropriate if its
other requirements were met: inability to
locate monuments established in original
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survey, Holmes v. Judge. 31 Utah 269, 271,
87 P. 1009. 1010 (1906); internal inconsistencies in plat. Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah
229, 233, 108 P. 1124, 1126 (1910): no official or original plat or survey by which the
boundary line can be located, Jensen v.
Bartlett, 4 Utah 2d 58, 60. 286 P.2d 804,
806 (1955); disagreement among different
surveyors on location of boundary line, id.;
landmarks referenced in deeds have disappeared, Joaquin v. Shiloh Orchards, 84
Cal.App.3d 192, 148 Cal.Rptr. 495, 496
(1978); uncertainties or disputes created by
conflicting terms in deeds, such as overlapping descriptions, Motzkus v. Carroll 7
Utah 2d 237, 239, 322 P.2d 391, 393 (1958);
or metes and bounds descriptions that do
not close, Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d
105, 110-11, 369 P.2d 117, 120-21 (1962).
Boundary by acquiescence should also be
available where there are other inconsistencies that create reasonable doubt in the
meaning of the record title or in its application to the actual on-the-ground location of
the property identified in the record.4
III. BURDEN OF PROOF OF
OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY
An early line of cases placed the burden
of proving uncertainty or dispute on the
party claiming boundary by acquiescence.
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah at 93-94, 34
P.2d at 698-99; Home Owners' Loan
Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah at 219-20, 141
P.2d at 166; Willie v. Local Realty Co.,
110 Utah at 530-32, 175 P.2d at 722-23;
Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah at 272-73, 209
P.2d at 260. For example, since the fence
in Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley,
supra, "was not shown to have been established to settle any dispute or to establish
any boundary line, the true location of
which was unknown or even uncertain,"
boundary by acquiescence wTas held to have
failed. 105 Utah at 219, 141 P.2d at 166.

In some of the opinions of this court on
the subject of disputed boundaries, there
are statements to the effect that the
location of the true boundary must be
uncertain, unknown or in dispute before
an agreement between the adjoining
landowners fixing the boundary will be
upneld, citing Tripp v. Bagley, supra, in
support thereof
But the Tripp case
does not require a party relying upon a
boundary which has been acquiesced in
for a long period of time to produce
evidence that the location of the true
boundary was ever unknown, uncertain
or in dispute. That the true boundarywas uncertain or in dispute and that the
parties agreed upon the recognized
boundary as the dividing line will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence.
120 Utah at 27, 232 P.2d at 208. Numerous decisions after Brown v. Milliner used
a similar approach, either by omitting this
subject from the list of elements to establish the doctrine or by requiring the defending landowner to prove "the absence of a
dispute or uncertainty in fixing the boundary" as a means of rebutting a presumption of boundary by acquiescence. Wright
v. Clissold, 521 P.2d at 1226. See. e.g..
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury,
26 Utah 2d at 37, 484 P.2d at 174; King v.
Fronk, 14 Utah 2d at 138. 378 P.2d at 895;
Motzkus v. Carroll, 7 Utah 2d at 242-43,
322 P.2d at 395-96.

A few years later, however, in Brown v.
Milliner, supra, this Court rejected the
ruling in this line of cases, stating:

However, in Florence v. Hiline Equipment Co., Utah, 581 P.2d 998 (1978), this
Court was again squarely faced with the
question of who should carry the burden of
proof. In holding that boundary by acquiescence did not apply, the trial court had
stated as a conclusion of law "[t]hat the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
arises only when the true boundary is either unknown, uncertain, or in dispute,
none of which was proved in this case."
Id. at 1000. The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Hall (only one justice
dissenting), affirmed that decision and its

4. Parties also remain free to settle uncertainties
or disputes through boundary by agreement or
by the use of quitclaim deeds or other legal

documents. Disputants may also acquire property through adverse possession, as provided by
statute. §§ 78-12-2 to -21.
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statement of the law, noting that it was
"consistent with this Court's prior holdings." Id. The Florence holding wras apparently ignored (but not questioned) in
three subsequent cases.5 Then, in rejecting boundary by acquiescence, our two
most recent cases discuss the absence of
uncertainty or dispute in conjunction with
the affirmative requirements of the doctrine and contain no intimation that this
subject is part of the burden of a record
landowner seeking to rebut a presumption.
Icon v. Dansie, Utah. 639 P.2d 730 (1981);
Madsen v. Ciegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726 (1981).
In the latter case, this Court stated: "In
the absence of any initial
uncertainty
concerning the ownership of the property
in question, the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence has no application." Id. at
729 (emphasis added).

hold that the party claiming boundary by
acquiescence has the burden of proving
objective uncertainty as part of the prima
facie elements of the doctrine of boundary7
by acquiescence.6 Notwithstanding this allocation of the burden of proof, the record
landowner may, of course, conclusively negate the existence of objective uncertainty
by proving that the claimant or his predecessors in title had reason to knowT the
location of the true boundary before the
expiration of the period of acquiescence.

The question of burden of proof is about
evenly balanced on the authorities. On
policy, both positions are supportable by
persuasive arguments. The allocation of
the burden of proof could therefore depend
on what one assumes about whether it is
the record owner or the claimant by acquiescence who has superior access to facts
about events long past, but that basis of
decision is unacceptable because either assumption could be made and neither could
be justified empirically. In this circumstance, we are especially well advised to
limit our rule of law to the facts before us.

[7] Although there are no direct findings relating to the requirement of uncertainty, the court did find that "[t]here is no
record title in either [the Bigelows or Cluff]
to the property in dispute." Neither of
these claimants challenges the factual basis for that finding. In addition, there is no
evidence of any objectively measureabie circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available survey information that
would have prevented the claimants from
using these means to ascertain the true
boundary on the ground. On the contrary,
the evidence clearly shows that both claimants had ready access to deeds and had
actually examined surveys clearly establishing the Halladays' record title to the
property in dispute. Consequently, the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is
inapplicable as a matter of law in the circumstances of this case. The decree relying on that doctrine in quieting the claimants' title to parcel A-B-OD must therefore be reversed.7

[5,6] This case involves property in the
city of Provo, where survey information is
readily available. It is therefore reasonable for the law to require the parties in
this case to locate their property lines on
the ground by means of the record title and
reasonably available survey information
rather than by acquiescence in a fence line
or other identifiable points on the ground.
Consequently, as to this circumstance we
5. These cases, cited note 2 supra, do not list
uncertainty or dispute as an affirmative requirement of boundary by acquiescence.
6. We express no opinion on whether this allocation of the burden of proof would apply to
property not located in a city or platted area.

IV. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
We are mindful that the district court
had to rule on the facts of this case in the
face of the contradictory authorities we
have discussed. Since we have now undertaken to clarify the rules pertaining to this
case, our task is much easier.

7. Our resolution of this issue makes it logically
unnecessary for us to rule on the other issues
tendered by appellants.
We also forego answering the numerous arguments and charges in the dissenting opinion.
We do caution that the meaning and intent of
this opinion should not be judged by the content
of the dissent, because we do not acquiesce in
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The decree is re\ersed and the case is
remanded to the district court for the efltrv
of a new decree m conformitv with this
opinion No costs awarded
HALL CJ and STEWART ana DUR
HAM JJ concur
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent
mg)
I concur m the result on the limited
ground that both the Bigelow*; and the
Cluffs who rely on boundary by acquies
cence had actually examined surveys dur
ing the penod of acquiescence showing the
Halladay s ownership of the propertv m
dispute Once the\ examined the surveys
they had reason to knovv that the line ac
quiesced in was not the true line and they
could acquire no rights thereafter
In
Tripp i Bagley, 74 I tan 57 276 P 912
(1928) this Court held the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence to be not applicable because the evidence affirmatively dem
onstrated that when the boundarv fence
was erected the parties knevv that it was
not on the true line and further the\ could
not have believed it to be on the true line
since the true line vvas straight north and
south along a section line whereas the
boundary fence had angle turns m it like a
dog's leg This requirement was again rec
ognized m Willie % Local Realty Co 110
Utah 523 175 P 2d 718 (1946) More re
cently, in Florence i Hihne Equipment
Co, Utah 581 P2d 998 (1978) this Court in
holding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence not applicable noted that both the
joining owners knew w here the true boundary was located and thus they did not treat
a fence which ran between their properties
as marking the boundary Similarly m
Madsen v Clegg, Utah, 639 P 2d 726 (1981),
we stressed the fact that the fence running
between the two properties ran m a
strfc\ght l\i\%, whereas the parties deed
the dissent s interpretation of this opinion To
cite only one example a boundarv located on a
surveyed line could quahfv for boundarv b\
acquiescence even though a subsequent surve\
showed the original survev to have been in
error A rule of law that is intended to encour
age landowners to relv on record title mforma

lines which coincided along this course had
two right angle turns in them In all of
these decisions the parties had reason to
know that the acquiesced line was not the
true line or that fact was implicit The
doctrine of boundary b\ acquiescence was
held m each case to be not applicable
I regard most of the balance of the ma
jontv opinion to be dicta and an unwarranted assault upon boundary by acquiescence
as it has been developed by the cases of
this Court over the past 80 years I dis
sent from much of it especially from the
announcement that boundary b\ acquiescence should be further restricted and not
applied where the adjoining land owners
could have or should have had their proper
ties surveved before the boundary was
marked on the ground I cannot subscnbe
to that announcement for the following
reasons
The doctrine of boundan by acquies
cence has aiwa\s been very restricts ely
applied Since it operates to taKe from the
fee owner a small strip of his land it has
never been given broad application Only
in those exceptional circumstances where
all four of the following elements were
present has it been employed (1) occupa
tion up to a visible line marked by monuments fences or buildings (2) mutual ac
quiescence in the line as a boundary, (3)
for a long period of time (4) by adjoining
land owners
Goodman i Wilkinson
I tan 629 P 2d 447 (1981) Since the doctrine was first announced in Holmes i
Judge 31 Utah 269 87 P 1009 (1906), it
has been applied onh m approximately 25
cases reaching this Court (see appendix)
The effect of the announcement by the
majority opinion is to sub silentio overrule
most of those cases In a thoughtful and
wrell-considered opinion written by Justice
Fnck of this Court m Holmes v Judge,
supra, \t Vv2ts pomte^l out that the tacxrvne
tion and reasonabh available surve\ informa
tion will not be applied to penalize a landowner
who has done just that If the original surve\
was in error that is a clear instance of objective
uncertainrv and boundar\ b\ acauiescence will
appiv if its other elements are proved
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boundary by acquiescence rests upon
sound public policy; that it was a doctrine
of repose with the view of quieting titles
and preventing strife and litigation concerning boundaries. Many years later. Justice Crockett in Hobson i. Panguitch Lake
Corp., Utah, 530 P.2d 792 (1975), endorsed
this same public policy when he said:
That in the interest of preserving the
peace and good order of society (sic) the
quietly resting bones of the past, which
no one seems to have been troubled or
complained about for a long period of
ve ars, should not be unearthed for the
purpose of stirring up controversy, but
should be left in their repose.
Now the majority seems to say that this
iong recognized public policy should be
abandoned; that the bones of the past may
be unearthed and controversy permitted if
when the boundary was marked on the
ground (by fences, trees, etc.) 30, 40 or 50
vears ago it was feasible for the then owners to have surveyed their properties which
supposedly would have resulted in the
placement of the boundary on the deed line.
There are three major difficulties with that
approach. In the first place, a survey may
have been actually made and the boundary
marked on that line. Because of the lapse
of many years, no one who was then
present may be alive or available. Just
because a recent survey shows the marked
boundary to be incorrectly placed does not
prove that the then owners, many years
ago, did not have a survey made on which
they relied in establishing the marked
boundary. As finer and more precise instruments of survey are developed, property lines established in accordance with earlier surveys may often be shown to be out
of place by later surveys. Under the rule
adopted by the majority, apparently the
later survey would govern and a marked
boundary which may well have been established in reliance on the earlier survey
would yield. In Wacker v. Price, 70 Ariz.
99, 216 P.2d 707 (1950), the Court emphatically rejected such a suggestion and quoted
with approval the following statement appearing in a Michigan case, Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601 (1878):

Nothing is better understood than that
few of our early plats will stand the test
of a careful and accurate survey without
disclosing errors. This is as true of the
government surveys as of any others,
and if all the lines were now subject to
correction on new surveys, the confusion
of lines and titles that would follow
would cause consternation in many communities. Indeed, the mischiefs that
must follow would be simply incalculable, and the visitation of the surveyor
might well be set down as a great public
calamity. But no law can sanction this
course.
The majority assures us that a new survey
would not necessarily be allowed to upset a
boundary set on an earlier survey. But
after the lapse of many years, no one may
know that an earlier survey was made.
Thus, the later survey will be followed and
the boundary, long recognized, will be
moved.
Secondly, the boundary dispute is here
and now. It does little good to reflect as to
what the then owners 30, 40 or 50 years
ago might have done and disregard entirely
the conduct of the owners and their successors since that time in acquiescing in the
markers on the ground. In most cases, the
acquiescence is an unconscious act with no
thought being given during the period of
acquiescence to the boundary, let alone
with surveying it. Thirdly, this Court
should not embark upon the impossible
task of trying to determine in each case
whether the owners 30. 40 or 50 years ago
could have afforded a survey had they then
given thought to the boundary or whether
the value of the property at that time
would have been worth it, depending upon
whether the boundary dispute arises "in
city and platted areas" or whether it arises
in "rural or wilderness areas." The answers to such inquiries will he impossible
to obtain. The inquiry apparently will be
subjective. Yet in many cases the builders
of the marked boundary will be dead or will
have long since sold their interest in the
property and be unavailable. Our cases on
boundary by acquiescence for the past 80
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vears have approached boundan disputes
with the view that it is not unjust in certain
cases to require disputing owners to live
with what the> and their predecessors have
acquiesced m for a long period of time
Today the majontv turns its back on that
philosoph} and now wants to explore and
decide boundary cases on what might have
been This approach is not practical and I
believe will prove to be unworkable
Holmes i Judge supra, and its progeny
have been consistent in rejecting the notion
that boundary by acquiescence should onh
be applied when the true line could not
have been ascertained bv a survey This
contention was put to rest m an earlier
case, Young v Hyland, 37 Utah 229, 108
P 1124 (1910) Two years later, in Binford v Eccles, 41 Utah 453, 126 P 333
(1912), Chief Justice Fnck again dismissed
that contention in the following words
Appellant would thus be permitted to
unsettle boundaries whidh by the adjoining land owners had been recognized and
acquiesced in for approximate!} a quarter of a centur} Any rule oflau which
would permit such a result would be
pernicious and in the long run would
produce strife and litigation, and in
the nature of things would often result
in injustice if not oppression [Emphasis added]
More recently in Willie i Local Realty
Co, supra and in Ekberg i Bates 121
Utah 123, 239 P2d 205 (1951), this Court
again rejected the suggestion that boundary by acquiescence should not apply unless it could be demonstrated that the true
line could not be ascertained b\ a survey
The majority advocates that we "return"
and now follow an obscure statement made
m Glenn i Whitney, 1LB Utah 267, 209
P2d 257 (1949), that "lack of knowledge as
to the location of the true boundary is not
synonymous with uncertainty " The subject of surveying wras not discussed in that
case and it is this writer's opinion that that
statement does not refer to surveying
However, if that statement means that
there can be no uncertainty in the absence
of a survey, it is out of harmonv with every
other case of this Court on the subject and

should be summanlv disavowed
The
statement was dicta since the evidence
showed that the person who had erected
the old fence did not own land on either
side of it and boundan bv acquiescence
clearlv did not applv
In a surprising turnabout in thinking and
public policy, the majontv opinion now proclaims that the stirring up of controversy is
avoided litigation is prevented and repose
of title and stability m boundaries is promoted if "those who purchase, use or sell
real property may rely on descnptions m
deeds and reasonably available surve} information to settle boundary questions m
the first instance" As I have already
pointed out generally reliance on descnptions m deeds and available survey information is salutarv However m those rare
instances where the elements of bounoarv
bv acquiescence are present an exception
has been recognized ano disputing neighbors are not permitted to depart from that
which they have long acquiesced m This
does no mischief to those who purchase,
use or sell real propem as the majonu
opinion maintains since it is not unfair to
charge buyers with taking notice of a
marked boundary which is there to be seen
m plain sight Boundary by acquiescence
cases often anse when one adjoining land
owner decides to sell his propem and a
survey is made bv him or his buyer revealing that the marked boundarv encroaches a
few inches or sometimes a few feet Rather than disturbing the long acquiesced in
boundary, the law has been and is that the
boundary shall not be disturbed but the
buyer ma\ protect himself b} requiring a
reduction m the purchase pnce by the vendor to compensate for the shortage of property If fortuitously the survey shows that
the seller has an excess of property, the
buyer reaps the bargain of it Either wav
*he old boundary is preserved and stnie
and litigation is prevented No innocent
person is harmed Only that owner who
has slept on his nghts is made to live with
that which he has long accepted
I dissent from many statements made m
part I of the majontv opinion First proof
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uncertainty or dispute is not and has
never been an ' ingredient' or element of a
cause of action for boundary bv acquiescence Tripp i Bagley supra cited by the
majontv does not so hold Uncertainty and
dispute were discussed in that case m connectior with an express parol boundary
agreement where it must be proved to
overcome the bar of the statute of frauds
The part} reiving on the oral agreement
must show that the location of true boundary was unknown uncertain or disputed
*hen the agreement was made, otherwise
the orai agreement is invalid as an attempt
bv the contracting parties to transfer ownership of real estate without a writing
Tne plaintiff in that case also relied upon
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
but this Court held it to be not applicable
for the reasons already stated m the first
paragraph of this ODimon viz. when the
bounaarv fence was erected the parties
knew that it was not on tne true line because of its angle turns The Court did not
hold that a party relying upon boundary by
acquiescence had to affirmatively show7
that the boundary was erected following
uncertainty or dispute Such a requirement would be entirely foreign to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because
the basis of the doctrine is that the law
implies that there once existed uncertainty
and dispute and that the adjoining owners
mutually agreed upon the marked boundary ir settlement Holmes v Judge, supra

known to the adjoining owners thev cannot by parol agreement establish the
boundary elsewhere As was pointed
out m the Tripp case, such an agreement
would be in contravention of the statute
of frauds But the Tripp case does not
require a partv reiving upon a boundary
which has been acquiesced in for a long
period of time to produce evidence that
the location of the true boundary was
ever unknown, uncertain or m dispute
That the true boundary was uncertain or
m dispute and that the parties agreed
upon the recognized boundary as the dividing line will be implied from the parties' long acquiescence Roberts v Brae,
5 Cal 2d 356, 54 P 2d 698 In Holmes v
Judge supra, this court, speaking
through Mr Justice Fnck, set forth the
following requirements necessary to estabhsn a boundan by acquiescence The
line must be open visible marked by
monuments fences or buildings and recognized as the boundary for a long term
of years It was expressly stated by the
court m that case that there was no
evidence how the fence and building
which were recognized as the boundary
came to be erected, or that there was
ever any dispute between the adjoining
owners concerning the location of the
true boundan or that any question was
ever raised as to its location until shortly
before the plaintiff commenced his action

If there was ever any question about this
proposition our opinion m Brown v Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P 2d 202 (1951),
decided many years after Tripp v Bagley,
supra, clarified that matter and put it to
rest
In some of the opinions, of the court on
the subject of disputed boundaries, there
are statements to the effect that the
location of the true boundary must be
uncertain, unknown or m dispute before
an agreement betw een the adjoining land
owners fixing the boundary will be upheld citing Tripp i Bagley, supra, m
support thereof
Such statements
should be understood to mean that if the
location of the true boundary line is

This explanation was again set out m haec
verba m Motzkus v Carroll, 7 Utah 2d
237, 322 P 2d 391 (1958) where we expressly rejected the contention that the party
relying on the long recognized boundary
must prove that it was once unknown, uncertain or in dispute Justice Wade, writing for the Court, stated
[I]t is clear that where a party by evidence establishes a long period of acquiescence in a fence as marking the boundary line between two tracts, he is not
required to also produce evidence that
the location of the true boundary line
was ever unknowTn, uncertain or in dis
pute The establishment of a long period
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The majority opinion in the face of 80
years of cases to the contrary also places
the burden of proof that an uncertainty or
dispute once existed upon the party relying

upon the old established boundary. By so
doing, one of the foundations of the doctrine is destroyed, viz., that the law implies that the landowners were once uncertain or in dispute and the boundary was
marked on the ground in settlement.
Holmes v. Judge, supra. This implication
is drawn because due to the passage of
time, there is often little or no evidence
available as to the erection of the boundary
marker. Without being able to rely on the
implication, the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence cannot continue to exist as a
workable and viable doctrine. Our cases
have recognized that lack of uncertainty or
dispute can be raised as a defense against
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
by the person assailing the old boundary7.
Wright v. Clissold, Utah, 521 P.2d 1224
(1974). Motzkus v. Carroll supra, and
Universal Investment Corp. v. Kingsbury,
26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173 (1971), properly
held that like other defenses the burden of
proof is upon the person asserting the defense. We explained in our opinion in
Wright v. Clissold, supra, that once the
four elements of boundary by acquiescence
(named above) are established, the Court is
required to presume the existence of a
binding agreement unless the party who
assails it proves by competent evidence
that there was actually no agreement be
tween the adjoining land owners or there
could not have been a proper agreement.
Said the Court:

1. The cases cited by the majority make only the
briefest mention of uncertainty and dispute;
none of them hold that the party advocating
boundary by acquiescence must prove as an
element of his cause of action that the fence,
etc. was erected because of uncertainty or dispute by the adjoining land owners. For example, in Madsen v. Clegg, Utah, 639 P.2d 726
(1981), Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209
P.2d 257 (1949), Homeowners Loan Corp. v.
Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 ?2d 160 (1943), and
Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697
(1934) it appears to this writer that uncertainty
and dispute was mentioned as an element of an
express parol agreement; most of those cases
cite Tripp v. Bagley, supra, which gives credence
to my interpretation. In two other cases cited
by the majority, Wright v. Clissold, Utah, 521
P.2d 1224 (1974), and Universal Investment Corp.
v. Kingsbury, 26 Utah 2d 35, 484 P.2d 173
(1971), it was stated that lack of any uncertainty

or dispute at the time the fence was erected
could be shown as a defense by the party resisting boundarv by acquiescence. In Leon v. Dansie, Utah, 639 >.2d 730 (1981). "dispute" was
mentioned not as a requirement but "that there
had been no dispute as to record title [not as to
the location of the boundary] at any time over
the years." In most of the above cases the
mention of uncertainty and dispute was dicta
since the case was decided on other grounds.
For example, in Leon v. Dansie, Wright v. Clissold and Glen v. Whitney, the fence was shown
to have been erected not as a boundary but
simply to contain livestock. Similarly, in Glenn
v. Whitney, the person erecting the fence did not
own land on either side of it; in Homeowners
Loan Corp. v. Dudley the same person owned
the land on both sides of the fence and in
Peterson v. Johnson the land on one side of the
fence was in the public domain.

of acquiescence in a fence as marking
the boundary line between two tracts by
the respective owners gives rise to a
presumption that the true boundary line
was in dispute or uncertain, which
places, at least the burden of producing
evidence that there was no dispute or
uncertainty but that the true boundary
line was known to the respective owners
on the party claiming that such was the
fact. Where, as here, there is evidence
on that question other than the proof of
acquiescence in the fence as marking the
boundary line for the required long period of time the trial court must find that
the boundary line by acquiescence has
been established.
(Emphasis added.) Justice Wade cited as
his authority Brown v. Milliner, supra,
which in turn relied on the original acquiescence case, Holmes v. Judge, supra.
In view of the foregoing unequivocal pronouncements of this Court, I cannot agree
with the majority that "we have concluded
from the more recent cases and from the
clear weight of authority that the relevance
of this ingredient [uncertainty and dispute]
is settled in our law." None of the cases
cited by the majority in support of that
statement do in fact so hold.1
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Facts which prove the latter include the
following:: (1) no parties available to
make an agreement, e.g., sole ownership
of the property with the existing line
which was later transferred in tracts to
two or more other persons; (2) the line
was set for a purpose other than setting
a boundary; (3) the absence of a dispute
or uncertainty in fixing the boundary;
and (4) . . .
I disagree with the majority opinion that
some of our cases have placed the burden
of proof upon the party relying upon
boundary by acquiescence. My reading of
the cases cited by the majority indicates
that who has the burden of proof was not
an issue in any one of them, and I consider
the incomplete statements in those cases
upon which the majority relies to be dicta
as far as burden of proof is concerned. On
the other hand, in Motzkus v. Carroll, supra, burden of proof was a vital issue and
it was there held that the party relying
upon the old boundary fence is not required
to produce evidence that the location of the
true boundary line was ever unknown, uncertain or in dispute.
I dissent from the adoption of the rule
proposed by the majority in Part II that:
[T]he property line shown on the record
title cannot be displaced by another
boundary unless it is shown that during
the period of acquiescence there was
some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the reasonably available survey information (or other
technique by which record title information was located on the ground) that
would have prevented a landowner as a
practical matter from ,being reasonably
certain about the true location of the
boundary. By the same token a claimant
cannot assert boundary by acquiescence
if he or his predecessors in title had
reason to know the true location of the
boundary during the period of acquiescence.
I am in accord with the second sentence.
The instant case provides an illustration of
that rule, viz., during the period of acquiescence, Bigelow and Cluff had access to a
survey which indicated that they did not

own to the fence to which they claim.
However, the first sentence quoted above
seems to be out of harmony with the second sentence. It seems to require proof of
a negative, i.e., proof by the person relying
on boundary by acquiescence that he and
his predecessors were prevented for some
reason from having a survey made which
would have determined the location of the
true line. So far as this writer knows only
the lack of money could really keep any
land owner from having a survey made. Is
that now going to be a vital and valid
inquiry by the Court in future boundary
cases?
I believe that a rule which would serve
us better and which would be workable
might be simply stated as follows:
A claimant cannot assert boundary by
acquiescence if he or his predecessors in
title during the period of acquiescence
had reason to know that the boundary
acquiesced in was not on the true line.
This "reason to know" could come about
because of information contained in the
record title or in existing survey information or information from other sources
which would put a reasonable man on
notice that the boundary acquiesced in
was not on the true line.
Since the reasonable man standard is used
in other areas of the law I would hope that
it would work well here. It would provide
courts with the basis for refusing to apply
boundary by acquiescence where the discrepancy was apparent and the acquiescence was blindly indulged in. On the other hand, we must not expect too much from
the rule since being familiar with the legal
description of one's property and locating
that description on the land are two entirely different things. That is why surveys
are made. However, the rule would serve
well in instances like Tripp v. Bagley, supra, where an old fence line had several
angle turns in it whereas the true line was
straight north and south along the section
line; and in Madsen v. Cleggf supra, where
the boundary fence ran on a straight line.
whereas the deed lines of both parties had
right-angle turns in them. In both cases
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the landowners had reason to know that
the fence was not on the true line.
Part III of the majority opinion ends with
the observation that because the property
involved in this case is in the city of Provo
survey information is readily available and
it is reasonable for the law to require the
parties to locate their property lines on the
ground by means of a survey. It appears
to me that this statement is out of harmony
with earlier statements in the opinion
which indicated that the Court should look
at the situation as of when the acquiescence began to determine whether it was
feasible for a survey to have been made—
not 20 years later when this litigation was
commenced.
In conclusion, I am concerned that the
rules laid down by the majority are unclear
and unworkable as I understand them.
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
has a proper place in our jurisprudence and
in my opinion has served well the public
policy which brought it into existence in the
first place. It has provided a fair basis for
settling disputes over often insignificant
amounts of land and has discouraged
countless p'roperty owners from feuding
with their neighbors when a recent survey
conflicts with long recognized lines.
Everything the majority argues and now
espouses was considered and rejected by
this Court in Holmes v. Judge, supra, when
Justice Frick wrote:
While the interests of society require
that the title to real estate shall not be
transferred from the owner for slight
cause, or otherwise than by law, these
same interests demand that there shall
be stability in boundaries, and that,
where parties have 'for a long term of
years acquiesced in a certain line between their own and their neighbor's
property, they will not thereafter be permitted to say that what they permitted to
appear as being established by and with
their consent and agreement was in fact
false.
For nearly 80 years wre have followed that
philosophy. But today the majority opinion
opens the way for any property owrner in

this state to have now his property surveyed (or resurveyed) and gain possession
of every inch contained in his legal description. Old surveys and boundaries built in
reliance thereon will be meaningless. I
believe that the majority opinion is a step
backward in achieving stability of boundaries in this state.
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KEARNS-TRIBUNE CORPORATION,
PUBLISHER OF the SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Petitioner,
v.
Honorable Eleanor S. LEWIS, Circuit
Court Judge, Respondent.
No. 19612.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1984.
Newspaper publisher petitioned for an
extraordinary writ seeking to vacate an
order of closure and to stay a preliminary
hearing in a criminal case involving three
defendants charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and
aggravated exploitation. The Supreme
Court, Oaks, J., denied the stay but called
for briefs on the merits, and held that: (1)
publisher's appeal was not moot, despite
fact that the preliminary hearing had been
concluded: (2) public's, including the media's. First Amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings in criminal
cases; (3) the people, including the media,
have a right of public access to criminal
trials and preliminary hearings under the
State Constitution, subject to certain excep-

tions; (4) the court can restrict or deny
access altogether where necessary to assure that a defendant receives a fair tnal
before an impartial jury; and (5) tnal
court's closure order failed to qualify for
the fair trial exception to the constitutional
right of access, and thus, was invalid,
where the closure order was not accompanied by written findings, and where no
evidence was submitted in the hearing on
the motion for closure.
Extraordinary writ granted, order closing preliminary hearing set aside.
Daniels, District Judge, concurred in
part and dissented in part and filed an
opinion in which Howe, J., joined.

1. Action c=6
Newspaper publisher's petition for an
extraordinary writ to vacate an order closing a preliminary hearing m a cnminal case
was not moot, despite fact that the closed
hearing had been held, in view of fact that
the case involved a question of considerable
public interest that would recur and evade
review unless held to be an exception to the
mootness doctrine. U.C.A.1953, 77-357(d)(2).
2. Constitutional Law c=>90.1(3)
Public's, including the media's, First
Amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings in criminal cases. U.S.
C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
3. Criminal Law <s=>238r2)
At a preliminary examination, prosecution has burden of introducing sufficient
evidence to persuade magistrate that there
is probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it. U.C.A.1953,
77-35-7(dXH.
4. Criminal Law <£=*230, 635
The people, including the news media,
have a constitutional right of public access
to criminal trials and preliminary hearings
under the State Constitution. Const. Art.
1, §§ 2, 15.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

7
8

^^

M. DAYLE JEFFS OF JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendant Cluff
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 373-8848

MACK HALLADAY and
MERLE HALLADAY,

9
Plaintiffs,

DECREE

10
vs.
11
12

MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K.
BIGELOW and NORMA G.
BIGELOW,

Civil No.

1,243

13
Defendants.
•14

/

15
This matter came before the Court for trial on the
16
28th day of August, 198C, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for
17
the plaintiffs, M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant
18
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants
19
Bigelow.

The parties presented their evidence and after

20
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts
21
and the law the Court took the matter under advisement.

On

22
December 3, 1930, plaintiff brought a motion to reopen for
23
the purpose of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs'
24
claim of title.

The court granted the motion to reopen and

25
received the additional evidence and having entered its
26
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters
27
the following:
28
D E C R E E
29
1.

Plaintiffs are granted a decree quieting

30
title to themselves to the following described property:
31
32
JEFFS AND JEFFS j
ATTORNCY8 AT LAW
• 0 NORTH 100 IAS7

*. O. MX MS
FR0V0 UTAH 8460!
(801) 373-6846

Commencing 606.35 feet West and 319.36 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
10.36 feet; thence North 1°00' East 174.10 feet; thence
South 89°00' East 7.49 feet; thence South 0°03 , 17" West
along a fence line 174.12- feet to the point of beginning.
Area = 0.04 acres
2.

Defendants Bigelow are granted a decree

quieting title to themselves in the area described as follows:
Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89°00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
7.29 feet; whence North i°00t
East 177.60 feet; thence
East 4.67 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence
line 177.70 feet to the point of beginning. Area=0.02 Acres
3.

Defendants Cluff and Bigelow are granted

a decree quieting title in that portion of tract #4 on Exhibits
8 and 12 cross-hatched in orange, more particularly described
as follows:
Commencing 588.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 118.10
feet; thence North 0°03'17" East along a fence line 55.31
feet; thence South 89°51'20" East along a fence line
118.20 feet; thence South 0°09'25" West along a fence
line 55.01 feet to the point of beginning. Area 0.15 Acres
Dated and signed this

2,^ day of July, 1981.

BY THE COURT:

George E,' Ballif, Jutige

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Decree
was mailed to the following attorneys this 23rd day of July,
1981 by placing same in the United States mails, addressed
as follows:
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M. DAYLE JEFFS Or JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84 601
Telephone: 373-8848
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

7
8

STATE OF UTAH
MACK HALLADAY and
MERLE HALLADAY,

9
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

10
11
12

vs.
Civil No.

MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K.
BIGELOW and NORMA G.
BIGELOW,

53,243

13
Defendants.

14

/

15
This matter came before the Court for trial on the

16
28th day of August, 1930, Brent D. Young, Esq., appearing for

17
the plaintiffs, II. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., appearing for defendant

18
Cluff, and S. Rex Lewis, Esq., appearing for defendants

19
Bigelow.

The parties presented their evidence and after

20
having presented final arguments to the Court on the facts

21
and the law the Court took the matter under advisement.

On

22
December 3, 1980, plaintiff brought a Motion to Reopen for

23
the purpose of offering additional evidence as to plaintiffs'

24
claim of title.

The Court granted the Motion to Reopen and

25
received the additional evidence and having fully considered

26
the same, now makes and enters its:

27
FINDINGS OF FACT

28
29
30
31
32
JEFFS AND JEFFS |
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
• 0 NORTH 1*0 IAST
9. 0 . M l

MS

FftOVO UTAH 146C1
<i0!> J 7 1 - « 4 i

1.

Plaintiffs and plaintiffs predecessors

in interest have occupied up to the visible boundary fenceline
in parcel 3 shown on Exhibit #12 and cross-hatched in green,

1
2

l y i n g w i t h i n t h e t i t l e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ,

3

for many y e a r s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y

4
5
6
7

Madge Kelson

d e s c r i b e d as

Cluff,

follows:

Commencing 606.35 f e e t West and 319.36 f e e t North from t h e
S o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of S e c t i o n 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n ; thence North 89 c 0 0' West
along t h e North boundary of 100 South S t r e e t , Provo, Utah
10.36 f e e t ? thence North 1 ° 0 0 ' E a s t 174.10 f e e t ; tnence
South 89 00' E a s t 7.49 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 0 ° 0 3 , 1 7 " West
a l o n g a fence l i n e 174.12 f e e t t o the p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g .
Area = 0.04 a c r e s

8
2.

9

The parties hereto have acquiesced in said

10

line as a boundary line for a long period of years as adjoining

11

land owners.

12

3.

The court finds tnat defendants 3igelow and

13

their predecessors in interest have occupied that strip of

14

land within the legal title of plaintiffs Kalladay on Exhibit

15

#12 in parcel 1, which is cross-hatched in brown.

16

hereto have acquiesced in said line as a boundary for a long

17

period of years by the adjoining land owners.

18

more particularly described as follows:

19
20
21
22

The parties

Said parcel is

Commencing 488.57 feet West and 317.30 feet North from the
Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 South, Range 2
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 00' West
along the North boundary of 100 South Street, Provo, Utah
7 . 2 9 ' f e e t ; t h e n c e North 1° 00' E a s t 177.60 f e e t ; thence
E a s t 4.67 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 0 ° 0 9 , 2 5 " West along a fence
l i n e 177.70 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g .
Area = 0.02 A c r e s .

23
24
25

4.

As to the property in controversy between

26

the plaintiffs and defendants Cluff and Bigelow shown on

27

Exhibit #12, cross-hatched in orange and marked by points

28

M-N-O-P, the court finds that:

29

(a)

The plaintiffs succeeded to a tax

30

title to the description outlined in yellow on Exhibit #12

31

and marked by points A-B-C-D.

Tax title was issued to George

32
J E F F S A N D JEFFS j
A T T O R N C Y * AT LAW
0 0 NORTH 100 EAST

0. o. M X ooa
/•ROVO. UTAH 14 001
(•OI)37S'tM0
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1
2

E. Collard by Utah County on the 23rd day of May, 1951 and

3

recoraed June 28, 1951 m

4

This document is defendant's Exhibit #27.

5

(b)

The tax deed is regular on its face.

6

(c)

The plaintiffs have never occupied

the office of the Utah County Recorder.

7

the area cross-hatched m

8

the area within the fencelmes identified on Exhibits #8 and

9

#12 as points P-M-N-Q.

10

(d)

11

orange on Exhibits #8 and #12, nor

The fence between points P-M-N-0 have

existed for many years.
5.

12

The fencelme marked P-M-N-0 has marked

13

the boundary of occupancy of the defendants Cluff and Bigelow

14

and tneir predecessors m
6.

15

interest since before 1948.

The defendants Cluffs and Bigelow and

16

their predecessors have built improvements upon the land,

17

have occupied it for purpose of farming, storage and business

18

operations.
7.

19

The fencelme M-N has been in existence

20

for over 50 years according to the testimony of plaintiffs'

21

witnesses.

22

8.

The only evidence of plaintiffs* asserting a

23

claim of ownership and title to the tract in dispute, cross-

24

hatched in orange, points M-N-O-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 was

25

an incident occurring in 1977 or 1978 when plaintiffs'

26

asserted title thereto as against defendant Bigelow and

27

ordered Bigelow to cease digging a potato cellar thereon.

28

Defendant Bigelow moved his digging within the ground to

29

which he held legal title, but testified that he did not

30

acknowledge plaintiffs' superior right to the land is dis-

31

pute.

32
J!

JEFFS A N D JEFFS j
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
• 0 NORTH 100 IAST
P ft l O l • • «

*R0V0 UTAH 1 4 * 0 1
<»0!> 3 7 J - 8 i 4 t
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1
9.

2

The court visited the premises and in

3

viewing the north boundary of the land in dispute, point

4

M-N on Exhibits 8 and 12, observed that there was a well

5

developed fencelme and a planted area marking that as the

6

area of occupancy as between the plaintiffs' property on

7

the north and defendant's property on the south.

8

possession of the disputed ground was in the defendants

9

as of the date of viewing as was shown by the witnesses

The

10

called and the documentary evidence, including photographs,

11

that were submitted to the court.
10.

12

There is no record title in either of

13

the defendants to the property in dispute.

14

legal title to their north boundaries is along a fence

15

approximately from point P to point 0 on Exhibits 8 and 12.
11.

16
17

The defendants

The acquisition of title by plaintiffs'

through the tax deed to George Collard of May, 19 51 include

18 ! a 20 foot strip within Halladays chain of title to parcels
19
20

6 and 7.
12.

Plaintiffs' chain of title to parcels 6

21

and 7 and the area north of points M to N on Exhibits 8 and

22

12 was not based on the tax sale.

23
24

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court now makes and enters its:

25
26

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes that neither the tax

27

title limitation statutes nor the succeeding to legal title

28

by tax deed cut off the defendants claims to title by

29

acquiescence to the property within the fences described

30

as M-N-O-P on Exhibits 8 and 12.

31

2.

The plaintiffs have established the

32
JEFFS AND JEFFS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
tO NORTH 100 CAST

P. 0. MX • • !
PR0V0. UTAH S4C01
(801) S7S>tt4t
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1
2

elements for boundary by acquiescence as to the cross-hatched

3

green area in parcel 3 on Exhibit 12 by establishing:
(a)

4

Occupation by defendants and their

5

predecessors in interest up to a visible line marked definitely

6

by fences and other visible monuments.
(b)

Acquiescence in the line as to the

9

(c)

For a long period of years.

10

(d)

By adjoining land owners.

7
8

11

boundary.

3.

The defendants Bigelow have established

12

the elements of a boundary by acquiescence as to the cross-

13

hatched area in brown on Exhibit 12 in parcel 1 by the same

14

standards set forth m

15

4.

paragraph 2 above.

The defendants have established title by

16

acquiescence to the property within the fences described as

17

points M-N-O-P on Exhibits 8 and 12 by the same standards set

18

forth in paragraph 2 above.

19

5.

The court concludes that as to each of

20

the above matters, the respective parties have established

21

their title by acquiescence pursuant to the rulings in

22

Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 143 (1964);

23

Hales vs. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (1979); and Brown vs. Peterson,

24

Supreme Court No. 16785 decided December 18, 1980.

25
26
27
28

Dated and signed this *2~<? day of J U L Y

1981.

BY THE COURT:

jS^t^

rqfi

^

/ ^ ^ ^ /

George EylBallif, Judge

29

V

30
31
32
JEFFS AND JEFFS |
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
t O NORTH 1 0 0 EAST
9. 0 . OOK 0 0 3

PROVO UTAH 8 4 6 0 !
(•01) 175-BI48
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